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The Royal Air Force, Bomber Command and the use of Benzedrine Sulphate: 
An Examination of Policy and Practice during the Second World War. 
 
James Pugh, University of Birmingham. Copyright: Author / SAGE / Journal of 
Contemporary History. Accepted for publication, 12 April 2016. 
 
In November 1942, Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) approved the use of 
amphetamine sulphate, known by its brand name, Benzedrine, for use on 
operations by its aircrews. The substance, a powerful stimulant with the ability 
to promote both wakefulness and wellbeing, had been subject to a strict policy 
of prohibition in the RAF since September 1939. The decision to reverse this 
policy was the culmination of a lengthy process within the Service, driven by 
laboratory and operational testing in conjunction with scientific, medical and 
military debate. This shift in policy and the subsequent use of the drug on 
operations, while of historical significance in its own right – reflecting historical 
attitudes to drugs and drug culture – is also pertinent to ongoing debates 
relating to the use of drugs in the military context.1 
                                                          
1
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amphetamines, see L. Iversen, Speed, Ecstasy, Ritalin: The Science of Amphetamines (Oxford 
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The RAF’s approach to Benzedrine policy and practice has been the 
subject of some discussion in the historiography. While no mention is made of 
Benzedrine use in the RAF’s official medical history or Britain’s official history of 
the strategic air offensive against Germany, it is evident that the RAF was 
concerned about the physical and psychological strain placed on its aircrew, 
and it expended considerable effort to support its human resources during 
operations. These conclusions are supported by the work of Mark Wells, Allan 
English and Nick Chapman who have emphasised that the RAF considered 
exercise, sleep, diet, rest and the provision of recreation facilities as vital in 
helping crews manage the strains of combat.2 
In terms of the drivers for policy and the introduction of Benzedrine on 
operations, the British official history of medical research during the conflict, 
suggested that, ‘[a]lthough the drug was shown to have certain disadvantages, 
its use was recommended, under medical supervision, in situations of stress 
where sleep was a threat to performance’. Alternatively, Nicholas Rasmussen 
has argued that based around ‘fuzzy medical logic’ and the ‘multiple, 
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overlapping meanings’ of fatigue, ‘… RAF Bomber Command … adopted 
Benzedrine for its effects on optimism, aggressiveness, military comportment, 
and the other aspects of emotional condition that figure in morale’; an argument 
supported by Martin Francis.3 Thus, a narrative exists in which Benzedrine is 
framed as either a frontline ‘psychiatric medication’ or a substance to help 
personnel manage wakefulness on operations.  
Moving into the operational sphere, debates focus on the manner in 
which the RAF governed access to the drug and the wider attitude of, and 
approaches to, the use of the substance by aircrew. For Francis, ‘RAF medical 
officers regularly distributed “wakey wakey” pills to aircrew (and WAAFs) who 
were suffering from fatigue. For many flyers benzedrine became virtually 
addictive. Doctors were only supposed to allocate the pills for use on missions 
… However, often little effort was made to regulate the supply of benzedrine’. 
Alternatively, Michael Gibson and Michael Harrison suggested that, ‘the drug 
was never widely used, tending to be issued by squadron medical officers only 
for specific missions when fatigue was likely’.4 The unequivocal, yet 
contradictory nature of such conclusions is surprising given the absence of 
research conducted on the operational use of the drug, and as Rasmussen 
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conceded, ‘[f]urther study of wartime documents written by the men and medics 
using Benzedrine will be needed to clarify the typical circumstances of the 
drug’s use in combat, and the experience of its effects’.5  
As such, the article seeks to explore how the RAF encountered 
Benzedrine and the processes by which it negotiated the medical, social, 
practical and operational landscapes that helped shape the evolution of policy 
and the motivations for utilising the drug. The article also examines the use of 
Benzedrine on operations, including a focus on oral history and new data 
gathered from interviews and questionnaires with former RAF aircrew. As Alan 
Derickson has observed, a trend for nocturnal operations coupled with 
technological advances during the Second World War led to ‘exhausting battles 
and made human endurance a major concern’. Therefore, the article focuses on 
RAF Bomber Command, the organisation tasked with pursuing Britain’s 
strategic bombing campaign against Germany, as the modus operandi of the 
Command was characterised by long-duration night-time operations in the face 
of intense German defences.6  
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Benzedrine generated ‘vivid interest’ in both medical and press circles in 
Britain, seeing the drug ‘engulfed in a wave of sensationalism’, but as Richard 
DeGrandpre has suggested, a complicated and often polarising narrative exists 
around psychoactives, with drugs transitioning from pharmacological ‘angels’ to 
pharmacological ‘demons’. While Benzedrine was a ‘miracle drug’ during this 
period, this depiction threatens to overshadow the RAF’s cautious response to 
the drug, with the Service recognising both the value and limitations of the 
substance.7 In turn, while there are persuasive arguments that the context of 
total war ‘relaxed the moral boundaries’ that constrained scientific research, 
enabling such technologies to be deployed with ‘potential downsides … very 
much an afterthought’, the RAF took the time to build a body of evidence that 
was specifically applicable to the use of Benzedrine in the operational air power 
context.8 Furthermore, given the subjective nature of such evidence, medical 
supervision and educational guidance — pragmatic and progressive efforts 
focused on harm reduction — were cornerstones of RAF policy. This included 
clear emphasis that Benzedrine was an imperfect, though useful, tool in the 
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struggle against aircrew fatigue; supporting Mark Harrison’s suggestion that the 
use of new medical technologies helped protect Britain’s limited human 
resource base.9 
In challenging the conclusions of Rasmussen, the article acknowledges 
the ambiguous qualities of fatigue, but suggests that Benzedrine was utilised to 
help with a relatively narrow aspect of this problem. This captures the tendency 
to downplay the significance the RAF attached to the effect of Benzedrine on 
wakefulness and the organisation’s concerns about the drug’s effects on 
wellbeing. As Derickson suggested, ‘[d]rugs were especially helpful in dealing 
with the war's irregular and unpredictable sleeplessness’.10 Finally, the 
operational evidence suggests that there was a tension between the official Air 
Ministry guidelines for the use of Benzedrine and the practicalities of managing 
the utilisation of the substance at the Squadron level. By nuancing and 
expanding upon the existing ‘top-down’ organisational / policy driven narratives 
and stressing the significance of individual agency and non-pharmacological 
factors in governing the effects and experience of amphetamines, the article 
acknowledges that Benzedrine was viewed by some aircrew as a useful tool in 
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sustaining wakefulness on operations.11 Frustratingly, some of the oral 
testimonies may have been compromised by interviewer bias, indicating the 
importance of acknowledging and mitigating the effects of contemporary 
opinions and attitudes relating to the use of legal and illegal drugs. 
 
In setting the wider context of the period, it should be noted that Benzedrine 
was one of the most high-profile drugs in Britain during the 1930s. Articles in 
The Lancet and the British Medical Journal (BMJ), two of the leading medical 
journals in Britain, indicated that Benzedrine was useful in the treatment of 
narcolepsy, that it had some positive effects on wellbeing, and that it could 
increase confidence and the ability to concentrate. Such research was 
tempered by warnings relating to the subjective and potentially negative 
qualities of the drug, which included irritability, restlessness and an inability to 
sleep.12 In speaking to the Royal Society of Medicine in October 1938, Dr H. 
Letheby Tidy, a figure who would go on to play an important role in the British 
Army’s testing and use of Benzedrine during the Second World War, echoed 
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these sentiments when he noted that, ‘Benzedrine was obviously a drug that did 
many different things to many different people, apparently also in different 
doses. A good deal of experience was clearly necessary for its use’.13 
In turn, the medical evidence was complicated by the social and cultural 
response to Benzedrine; a reaction captured in schizophrenic media reporting, 
which in part mirrored the variable effects of the substance. Stories from the 
Daily Express demonstrated this trend, with initial articles hailing the drug’s 
‘magical effects’. The enthusiastic tone of the Daily Express changed as 
concerns about unregulated access and the indiscriminate use of the drug 
developed; use promoted by the overexposure of Benzedrine in Britain’s lay 
press.14 This prompted a legislative response, part of the British government’s 
wider drug policy agenda of the 1920s and 1930s, which saw the addition of 
Benzedrine tablets to the Poisons List in January 1939 and access to drugs 
placed in the hands of medical and pharmaceutical professionals.15  
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Access to the sulfa drugs, which ‘carried the main therapeutic burden’ in 
terms of treating bacterial infections during the Second World War, were also 
restricted under this legislation, highlighting a similar process of cautious 
enthusiasm from scientific researchers about a substance, overenthusiasm from 
the lay press and widespread self-medication concluding in a process of ‘official 
intervention’. In practice the legislation did restrict access, but Benzedrine 
tablets were still available via medical prescription or if an individual was willing 
to sign the Poisons Register. Moreover, the legislation did not attach stigma (or 
the accompanying legal penalties) to amphetamine use in the same manner as 
drugs such as cocaine.16 
For Richard Davenport-Hines, it was the German use of the stimulant 
drug Pervitin during the summer of 1940 that drew the attention of Britain’s 
armed forces to the potential of such substances, and it was during this period 
that the War Cabinet first discussed the use of stimulants in the military context. 
This process also involved the coordinating role of the Medical Research 
Council (MRC), a government funded body that had sponsored research into 
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Benzedrine in the 1930s.17 However, the RAF’s interest in the drug preceded 
these developments, and in August 1939 the Air Ministry’s Director of 
Operational Requirements (DOR), Group Captain Robert Saundby, wrote to the 
Director General of the RAF’s Medical Services (DGMS) seeking advice as to 
whether ‘it might be possible to administer a harmless stimulant to aircraft crews 
to enable them to work without rest for an abnormally long time’.18 In response, 
staff for the DGMS noted that, of various stimulants, Benzedrine ‘has probably 
the most powerful action … in producing wakefulness’, although caution was 
urged relating to its subjective effects.19  
Such information had been obtained from Dr E. A. Carmichael, a 
researcher working for the RAF’s Flying Personnel Research Committee 
(FPRC), who had been investigating the suitability of certain drugs ‘for 
lessening the fatigue of aircrews’.20 The FPRC, created in January 1939, was a 
body composed of military and civilian experts whose duty was ‘to investigate 
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and to advise … [the Secretary of State for Air] on the medical aspect of all 
matters concerned with personnel which might affect safety and efficiency in 
flying’.21 This was funded by the Air Estimates of 1939, which allocated 
resources ‘for the first time for medical research into matters affecting personnel 
which are related to safety and efficiency in flying’.22  
As the minutes of the FPRC indicate, by June 1939 a list of research 
priorities had been established, including an examination of the ‘effects of 
fatigue and strain on flying personnel’.23 Of course, the issue of aircrew fatigue 
had been highlighted in 1935, and in addressing the United Services Section of 
the Royal Society of Medicine, Air Commodore A. V. Richardson, who would 
become DGMS, stated that fatigue was affected by physical, physiological and 
psychological factors that would only be accentuated in wartime and by 
increasingly sophisticated aircraft technology.24 The issue of aircrew fatigue was 
also raised at the same forum in December 1938 by Air Commodore H. E. 
Whittingham, who would succeed Richardson as DGMS. Whittingham also 
accepted the physical / physiological / psychological basis to fatigue and noted 
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12 
that RAF medical staff worked to improve the efficiency and wellbeing of 
personnel.25  
It was in this organisational context that Saundby made his request to the 
FRPC. In turn, given the prominence of Benzedrine in the medical and lay 
press, it is unsurprising that a scientist of Carmichael’s standing — Director of 
the MRC’s Neurological Research Unit – was aware of the substance. In 
responding to Carmichael’s ‘very interesting’ note, Saundby requested that the 
DGMS contact all RAF Commands to provide medical advice on the use of 
such substances. In the same minute, the DOR also reflected on the use of the 
word ‘drug’, noting that it ‘might conceivably cause misunderstandings among 
our own people, or even serve as material for enemy propaganda … [As such 
its use] should be avoided as far as possible’.26  
Here, in its most direct form, was evidence of the influence of the social 
and cultural sensitivities relating to drug use in Britain during this period. 
Saundby’s concerns, driven by the media profile of Benzedrine, were 
particularly astute as the British press were quick to highlight the German use of 
stimulants during operations in France in May 1940, with words such as 
‘drugged’ and ‘doped’ used on several occasions throughout the war to 
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emphasise the unethical and immoral fashion in which German armed forces 
were making use of amphetamines.27 While the pressures of conflict may have 
eroded some of these concerns, it is evident that such factors shaped the RAF’s 
approach to the substance. 
As a result of the DOR’s minute, a letter was circulated to all Principal 
Medical Officers (PMOs) in the RAF in late September 1939 establishing the 
organisation’s first policy relating to the use of Benzedrine, which was never to 
be issued to pilots while on duty because ‘[i]n susceptible individuals quite small 
quantities … may produce alarming symptoms’.28 The instructions also 
highlighted that stimulants were only to be utilised under ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ and only when an extended period of rest would be available 
after use. Nonetheless, some voices in the RAF questioned the complete 
prohibition on the use of Benzedrine by pilots on duty, and one MO emphasised 
that the substance could be a useful tool for prolonging the endurance of crews 
on long flights. Such comments were tempered by noting that Benzedrine 
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should not be used on a regular basis as this would indicate that an individual 
was being ‘repeatedly asked to do too much’.29  
Whittingham, then serving as Director of Hygiene, minuted a response to 
the staff of the DGMS, noting that the FPRC was already investigating the use 
of Benzedrine for aircrews and that it should not be utilised until it had been 
thoroughly tested in a decompression chamber. Thus, by the end of January 
1940, the RAF had confirmed its cautious policy based largely upon the 
evidential ambiguity found in the medical research from the interwar period. 
Moreover, such caution reflected that there was absolutely no data available 
relating to the use of Benzedrine in an operational flying environment; an 
environment very different to a clinical medical setting. Whittingham’s 
concluding comment that ‘[d]rugging against fatigue is to burn the candle at 
both ends’ may have had some basis in the medical literature, but it also 
manifested aspects of British social and cultural attitudes to the use of drugs 
during this period.30 Such attitudes continued to affect perceptions even after it 
had become clear that German armed forces were making use of the stimulant 
Pervitin during operations in the summer of 1940, and the Secretary of the MRC 
and Chairperson of the FPRC, Sir Edward Mellanby, commented that, ‘we 
                                                          
29
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should have to think twice before we recommended drugging troops and, unless 
the advantages are very great or become great under certain specified 
conditions, our natural inclination would probably be to turn them down’.31  
However, it was an MRC report of September 1940 that affirmed the 
advantages of Benzedrine in terms of both wakefulness and wellbeing, although 
only in emergency situations, as continuous use ‘would be at best ineffective 
and might be seriously detrimental’. This paper, discussed and supported at the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet, also echoed the pre-war scientific 
and legislative conclusions regarding the use of the drug under medical 
supervision.32 Encouragement from a Cabinet level committee served to focus 
efforts, and the FPRC recommended further testing to establish the value of 
Benzedrine. Thus, two important batches of testing were conducted, with 
reports submitted to the FPRC in October 1940 and January 1941 confirming 
the MRC’s findings.33 Again, it was these dualistic strands of promise and 
caution that continued to influence the RAF’s response and at no point was the 
                                                          
31
 TNA, FD 1/6377 – Letter, Sir Edward Mellanby to Professor F. L. Golla, 5 September 1940. 
Also, see TNA, FD 1/6377 – Letter, Sir Henry Dale to Mellanby, 29 June 1940 and Letter, Dale 
to Mellanby, 2 July 1940.  
32
 TNA, CAB 80/19/31 – Memorandum, MRC to Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 21 
September 1940; TNA, CAB 79/7/2 – Minutes, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 27 September 1940, 
7. 
33
 TNA, AIR 57/41 – FPRC Minutes, 11 September 1940, 6–7; TNA, AIR 57/2 – FPRC Report 
195, ‘Note on the Effect of Benzedrine on Height Tolerance’, 22 October 1940; TNA, AIR 57/41 
– FPRC Minutes, 30 October 1940, 4–5; TNA, AIR 57/3 – FPRC Report 234, ‘The Use of 
Benzedrine in Normal Subjects’, No date, and Report 237, ‘Investigation into the Psychological 
Effects of Benzedrine on Normal Adults’, January 1941. 
16 
organisation drawn into the ‘wave of sensationalism’ around the substance. It 
was no ‘miracle drug’ for the RAF, and data had to be gathered, including 
testing at simulated altitudes, which allowed the value of Benzedrine to be 
established.  
Such data could only be of limited use without undertaking trials under 
genuine operational conditions; a recommendation put forward in an FPRC 
paper of April 1941.34 With such trials in mind, an FPRC meeting in May 1941 
tasked Professor Frederick Bartlett, a senior academic working with the MRC 
and FPRC and an expert in fatigue, to summarise the accumulated evidence 
relating to the use of stimulants with a view to providing some recommendations 
relating to dosage, safety measures and frequency of use.35 While Bartlett’s 
conclusions indicated that Benzedrine provided no boost in performance, 
Benzedrine had an important effect in terms of sustaining both wakefulness and 
interest in the task at hand (as the testing earlier in the year had indicated). 
Thus, while Benzedrine did not enhance performance, it had a role to play in 
preventing the degradation of performance. More generally, Bartlett provided 
guidelines as requested by the FPRC, noting that Benzedrine was not to be 
taken regularly, that it was not a substitute for sleep, and that it was only to be 
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used if an adequate period of rest was available afterwards. For Bartlett, 
repeated use would not result in ‘an actual craving for [B]enzedrine … [but 
individuals would] come to rely upon it more than upon their own internal 
resources’.36  
Bartlett also concluded that, wherever possible, the administration of the 
substance should be subject to strict medical control, and because of the 
subjectivity of action, individuals must be tested on the ground before making 
use of the substance on operations. These cautious and partially positive 
recommendations, which echoed and reinforced the wider legislative agenda of 
the era — concentrating the control of drugs in the hands of medical 
professionals — would form the cornerstone of RAF policy. Furthermore, 
Whittingham noted that, ‘irrespective of any improvement in performance, its 
use would be an advantage during long flights when aircrews were apt to 
become sleepy’.37  
Initial operational trials were scheduled to take place in Coastal 
Command, where maritime patrol operations of extreme range and endurance 
were commonplace. Dr Roland Winfield, an RAF MO who worked closely with 
the FPRC, undertook these initial trials, producing reports in August and 
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October 1941; the latter focused exclusively on Benzedrine.38 While there are 
suggestions that Winfield saw pharmacological solutions as the ‘best antidote’ 
for the regulation of sleep and other fatigue related issues, his reports indicated 
that pharmacology was only a strand of his investigations into fatigue, and he 
also focused on diet, ergonomics, visual strain and the morale of crews.39 
Winfield recorded that in aircraft where rest was possible, sleep remained a 
crucial component in managing fatigue. Yet in aircraft where such facilities were 
not available, including aircraft types utilised by Coastal and Bomber 
Commands, the ‘intelligent use of this drug in selected cases to keep pilots alert 
and awake [was] justified’, as was its use in helping air gunners sustain 
concentration.40 This was an important distinction and it was clear that while 
Winfield and the RAF understood fatigue as a multifaceted phenomenon, 
including psychological and physical components, Benzedrine was framed as a 
tool to assist only with the wakefulness / sleep related aspects of fatigue.  
While it is possible to criticise the single-blind scientific basis of such 
tests, a methodology open to observer bias, Winfield noted his greatest strength 
as researcher lay in his ability to interact with aircrews under operational 
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conditions; vital given the limitations of post-operational interviews.41 As such, 
the process of collecting data from operational sorties had to balance the ability 
of the observer to gather intimate data against the bias that may follow as a 
result of this methodology and the obvious risk of losing a valuable researcher 
on operations.  
In terms of practical recommendations, Winfield echoed the comments of 
Bartlett regarding test doses and medical supervision. Where possible, Winfield 
had given test doses to aircrew involved in these trials to mitigate the potentially 
subjective and negative effects of the drug. Winfield also remarked that the 
return from a mission was the stage when crews were highly prone to fatigue, 
particularly if they had experienced an arduous flight and / or contact with the 
enemy. As such, he offered optimal dosing and timing advice based upon this 
operational reality. Finally, he suggested that the issuing of Benzedrine should 
be kept under close control by squadron MOs, including careful records kept 
about the amount and frequency of use by each aircrew member.42 While the 
recommendations were discussed at the FPRC meeting in August 1941, and 
the RAF was also pushing forward with plans to provide the drug in survival kits, 
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no approval was given, and the RAF continued to prohibit the operational use of 
Benzedrine.43 
A potential driver for further experimentation and the need to revise 
policy was highlighted by Winfield’s acknowledgement of the ‘popularity’ of 
Benzedrine and his suggestion that the ‘surreptitious’ use of the drug was 
‘beginning to be established’.44 Shortly after Winfield’s report was circulated 
news reached Whittingham of an enterprising junior officer seeking to create a 
chocolate bar infused with Benzedrine to help aircrew stay awake if forced to 
ditch at sea. This officer was instructed by Whittingham that the FPRC was 
undertaking research into the subject and it was this body to which such ideas 
and questions should be referred. This example helps demonstrate the 
awareness of Benzedrine at the lower levels of the RAF and the desire of 
Whittingham and the organisation to curtail unsanctioned experimentation and 
use.45 Moreover, the RAF was clearly familiar with government legislation 
relating to the Poisons List, and it was concerned about its personnel self-
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medicating with potentially dangerous drugs. This included concerns about 
another ‘miracle drug’ of the era, M & B 639 of the sulfa group of drugs.46  
These situations also highlighted the problems of enforcing a policy of 
prohibition, and, while guidance was issued on the use of alcohol, tobacco and 
other drugs, it was not clear how commanders or MOs were to prevent the use 
of Benzedrine, particularly if, as Winfield noted, the latter was easily obtainable 
from civilian sources and subsequently utilised in a functional and controlled 
manner during operations.47 While such concerns may have shaped RAF 
policy, the evidence of unofficial Benzedrine use is too limited to comment 
further on its scale or influence on this process. 
The next stage, trials of Benzedrine with bomber crews, had been 
agreed by the FPRC in August 1941, but the results of such trials would not 
arrive with the RAF until late September 1942. In the absence of further 
operational testing, it would be left to the MRC, the Air Staff and Whittingham to 
drive policy. In particular, the Prime Minister, who had shown a close interest in 
research with Benzedrine, was provided with an overview of current policy and 
practice in August 1942. The overview began by noting that the MRC 
recommended the use of Benzedrine on operations under medical supervision 
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and ideally with the opportunity to provide a test dose to the individual before 
operational use.48 While both Army and Navy policy followed the wider advice of 
the MRC, providing cautious approval for the use of Benzedrine, a minute from 
the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS), Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, to the 
Prime Minister’s office indicated that the RAF continued to recommend its 
prohibition on operations.49 
Due to the character of air power operations, particularly for bomber 
crews operating regularly over a two or three day period, adequate periods of 
rest would be required between operations, especially if Benzedrine had been 
utilised. Given the high-tempo nature of operations, such periods of rest were 
not always available to RAF aircrews, and use of the substance would be to 
‘whip the tired horse’; an example of VCAS borrowing a metaphor favoured by 
Whittingham. In addition, the subjective action of Benzedrine continued to worry 
the Air Staff, and VCAS observed that, given the varied effects on individuals, 
‘every pilot would have to be tested for his reactions to the drug’; a testing 
regime that would severely strain the RAF’s medical function. In turn, far from 
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believing Benzedrine would improve wellbeing, VCAS was concerned that the 
regular use of the substance, even under medical supervision, would lead to 
‘pilots … break[ing] down more quickly than under normal circumstances’.50  
Crucially, the RAF’s policy would shift in a relatively rapid manner, driven 
by two key reports. First, the FPRC discussed the use of Benzedrine in light of 
the MRC’s Army-specific recommendation that the substance should not be 
used by any individual ‘required to make important decisions’.51 For the FPRC, 
this meant that Benzedrine would be unsuitable for pilots and navigators, yet, 
for Whittingham, the MRC’s advice indicated Benzedrine was suitable for other 
aircrew members, especially air gunners, to ‘keep them alert, particularly on the 
homeward journey’. Thus, the FPRC issued a strong statement in favour of 
Benzedrine use in this context, subject to the now standard safety caveats.52 
This recommendation was given greater impetus as Winfield’s long awaited 
report, based on twenty operational sorties with Bomber Command, reached 
the FRPC in late-September 1942.53 
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Winfield’s report was notable for the dramatic testimony about the 
determination and precision of Benzedrine fuelled aircrews, and some 
personnel did comment on the positive effects of Benzedrine in terms of 
wellbeing, but to suggest these were the major drivers for the RAF’s 
introduction of the drug downplays the concerns of Winfield and the RAF about 
these very effects. While interested in effects relating to wellbeing and attitude, 
Winfield was also impressed, perhaps more so, with the ability of Benzedrine to 
promote wakefulness and to prevent the degradation of performance, 
particularly on the return journey.54  
Winfield highlighted that for bomber aircrews, the drivers of fatigue were 
feelings of tension (before the mission), excitement (on delivering the ordnance 
carried) and relief (on leaving the target area and heading home). Winfield’s 
observations were perceptive, underlining the vulnerability of aircrews on the 
return leg, particularly as individuals experienced fatigue driven by the post-
adrenal crash after attacking the target and the feeling that vigilance could be 
reduced as the mission neared completion. This vulnerability was of particular 
concern to Bomber Command, and 3 Group tactical notes issued in 1943 
observed that fatigue and tiredness contributed to much higher loss rates on the 
homeward journey. As Winfield continued, his trials had indicated that 
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Benzedrine was especially useful for air gunners due to fatigue induced by 
ergonomic factors.55 Thus, while the RAF and Winfield acknowledged the 
complex nature of fatigue, Benzedrine use in the aircrew context was targeted 
in a narrow fashion at the tiredness / wakefulness related aspects of fatigue. 
Importantly, Winfield’s recommendations went beyond recent FPRC 
guidance, and he felt that Benzedrine was suitable for all crew members, 
including pilots and navigators. Winfield was also able to allay another fear of 
the Air Staff; that Benzedrine would affect the ability of crew members to sleep 
on return from a mission. Some evidence of prolonged wakefulness was 
indicated, but Winfield noted this could be countered by utilising a smaller dose 
of Benzedrine in the first instance or by the use of a small dose of barbiturates 
on return from operations. While Winfield did observe the subjective, and 
sometimes negative, effects of the substance for some individuals, he stressed 
that Benzedrine could be used regularly without ill-effects; in practice, on every 
operation over a six month tour, although the decision to utilise Benzedrine had 
to remain with individual aircrew. Winfield concluded with the now standard 
safety-related measures while offering guidance with regards to the logistics of 
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administration, dosing and timing, which focused on the operationally vulnerable 
period of the return leg.56 
Winfield also noted that a significant driver for his experiments was that 
the standard pharmacological aid for assisting bomber crews with the 
wakefulness related aspects of fatigue, caffeine citrate, ‘often … [had] … little 
effect’. In use from the beginning of the conflict, which demonstrated that 
aircrews felt the need for pharmacological support to sustain wakefulness on 
operations, there were examples of positive feedback about this substance from 
MOs with 3 and 4 Group, and evidence from 8 Group, the famous Pathfinders, 
which demonstrated an ongoing preference for caffeine over Benzedrine.57 
While Benzedrine produced wellbeing related effects not present with caffeine, 
and Winfield’s crews commented favourably on these facets of the drug, a 
preference for Benzedrine was driven by the more ‘noticeable and prolonged’ 
action of the former, and there was wartime evidence that Benzedrine was a 
more powerful stimulant in terms of promoting wakefulness.58  
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Thus, rather than a change of policy based on Benzedrine’s effects in 
terms of wellbeing, a more persuasive explanation for the RAF’s decision was 
that FPRC evidence since at least 1941 had indicated Benzedrine was useful 
for promoting wakefulness and helping to prevent the degradation of 
performance; two issues highlighted as causing problems on operations. It was 
along such lines that Whittingham recommended the approval of Benzedrine 
use in the operational context.59 Such advice was enough to persuade the Air 
Council to approve the operational use of Benzedrine, and, as noted in the 
FPRC meeting of November 1942, Benzedrine was ‘to be used by aircrews 
under skilled medical supervision’. While the drug was officially sanctioned to 
help aircrews ‘ward off fatigue’, it was evident that the substance was to target 
the aspect of fatigue related to tiredness and wakefulness as opposed to issues 
relating to wellbeing or morale.60 
While the existing narrative of Benzedrine policy in the RAF stops with 
the FPRC’s minutes of November 1942, this was not the end of the matter, and 
the Air Council had requested, upon Whittingham’s recommendation, that 
Winfield’s findings were subject to verification during further operational flights.61 
Subsequently, Whittingham wrote to Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Air Officer 
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Commanding-in-Chief Bomber Command, to ascertain whether Winfield could 
undertake further trials with an operational Group. In writing to Harris, 
Whittingham concluded that, ‘his personal feeling [was] that [B]enzedrine 
properly administered, would be beneficial to personnel engaged on long 
arduous flights’. This proposal, accepted by Bomber Command’s PMO, saw 
Winfield deployed with 3 Group during the next round of testing.62  
Harris’ decision to approve the use of the drug supports suggestions that 
the former (and the RAF more generally), ‘devoted considerable energy to 
sustaining the mental and physical capabilities of combat airmen’; 
demonstrating the significance of medical technologies to support a limited base 
of human resources.63 Losses and rates of attrition, always a feature of Bomber 
Command operations, moved in peaks and troughs. The winter of 1942 / 1943 
was a period of great strain for Harris and his Command, with losses regularly 
threatening to limit operational effectiveness.64 In turn, the decision to monitor 
operational use in 3 Group may have reflected concerns expressed about the 
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Group during summer 1942, in which a cyclic process of heavy losses led to an 
increase in inexperienced crews and further losses.65  
Such concerns were supported by MOs operating with the Group, and 
one MO expressed concern regarding the pace of operations and its fatiguing 
effect on crews.66 Monthly summaries from 3 Group noted that a ‘hard 
campaign’ had been fought during 1942, including widespread failures to hit 
targets, technical and operational problems with aircraft, and a significant 
burden on squadrons relating to the use of non-operational flying time to 
complete the training of new aircrews.67 Moreover, given the strain on the RAF’s 
training establishment, a decision was made to abandon the inclusion of a 
second pilot in Bomber Command’s heavy bombers from April 1942. As such, 
pilots were generally without respite during operations from this point, 
particularly on long flights. These operational contexts help to build a picture of 
an organisation under significant strain, and the RAF was compelled to make 
the most of its human resources.68 Benzedrine use within these contexts, 
helping to keep valuable crews safe at their most vulnerable point, was clearly a 
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motivating factor for those at the operational and tactical levels within Bomber 
Command. Such contexts may have also helped the RAF overcome any 
lingering moral or medical concerns about the use of the drug.  
Of course, it must be acknowledged that the mental health of aircrews 
was also a highly significant consideration for the RAF, illustrated by the 
organisation’s infamous ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ policy, and senior commanders 
within the RAF and Bomber Command had doubts about the ability of aircrews 
to ‘withstand the strain of operations’, particularly during periods of intense 
operations and high losses.69 There is evidence that sedative-hypnotics formed 
a strand of the RAF’s approach to the management of mental health, but there 
is no evidence that the RAF approved Benzedrine use to help crews bear the 
psychological load of operations, in spite of an understanding of fatigue that 
encompassed a strong psychological component.70 As noted by VCAS and 
Bartlett, Benzedrine use in this context may have led to an increase in aircrew 
breakdowns, diminishing an individual’s internal resources.71 Moreover, pre-war 
evidence had indicated that continuous use of Benzedrine led to the ‘ecstasies’ 
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of the drug fading; in other words, a potential reduction in its wellbeing related 
effects with repeated use.72  
By mid-1943 the Air Ministry was ready to issue further guidance relating 
to the use of Benzedrine on operations. Included in a pamphlet on aircrew 
fatigue, which acknowledge the multifaceted nature of fatigue, the guidance was 
more cautious than the recommendations made by Winfield. For example, it 
was emphasised that Benzedrine could make an individual feel they were ‘on 
top of things’ when in reality they were ‘making all sorts of mistakes’. Again, far 
from pushing the wellbeing agenda, the Air Ministry cautioned against the 
effects of the drug from this perspective, and sleep, diet and other non-
pharmacological factors were stressed as being the most effective counters to 
fatigue. Thus, while the Air Ministry approved the use of Benzedrine, official 
guidance to crews contained an overwhelmingly cautious tone. It has been 
argued that the shifting tone reflected an accumulation of operational and 
scientific evidence that continued to show the limitations of Benzedrine. 
However, the tenor of the pamphlet seemed to be shaped by a genuine desire 
to educate crews that a pharmacological solution to fatigue, with a range of 
potentially unwanted subjective effects, was an imperfect weapon in the wider 
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battle against fatigue, that it was not a substitute for proper rest and that the 
drug had a limited function in terms of sustaining wakefulness. 73 
Such advice offers further evidence to revaluate historical narratives 
around Benzedrine, demonstrating the RAF’s rational and cautious approach to 
the drug. This pamphlet was part of a wider effort, and guidance issued to MOs 
since 1938 indicated that the organisation clearly understood the importance of 
sleep and rest in countering the effects of fatigue. Whether or not crews 
followed the advice of their MOs and directives from the Air Ministry is another 
matter, and even if the organisation stressed the importance of sleep in the fight 
against fatigue, for some aircrews nocturnal operations and the uneven ‘rhythm 
of existence [made] it impossible to obtain enough sleep’.74  
That Benzedrine should be issued under medical supervision was a key 
theme of the policy discussions of 1939 to 1943. Initial briefings had been 
provided to 3 Group station and squadron commanders involved in the post-
November 1942 trials, and more widespread guidance was published in 1943.75 
In interpreting such advice, it was apparent that, for some squadrons, ‘medical 
supervision’ simply meant that MOs would be responsible for administering 
Benzedrine to aircrews as part of the final briefing before the operation. Miles 
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Tripp, a bomb-aimer with No.218 Squadron, was aware of Air Ministry policy 
relating to Benzedrine, but he noted that, ‘in practice, one could simply ask for 
one or two “wakey-wakey” pills after every briefing’. In other examples, it was 
clear that MOs took an active role in supervising the use of Benzedrine, and 
some MOs gave their crews clear instructions, which followed the FPRC’s 
guidance: ‘take these [Benzedrine tablets] about half an hour before you get to 
the target’.76  
A more proactive approach was undoubtedly what the RAF expected of 
its MOs, but it is clear that MOs serving on bomber stations had a very heavy 
workload, especially when squadrons suffered heavy losses and high turnover 
of personnel; factors aggravated by the rapid expansion of the RAF that left 
MOs responsible for the care of up to 2,000 individuals.77 As such, it is likely 
that a cornerstone of the Air Ministry’s Benzedrine policy, the pre-operational 
ground test, was simply too intensive in terms of working hours to be 
implemented in practice. There may have been local variations, as with wider 
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medical supervision, but there is no evidence from aircrew accounts that such 
testing took place, and new data indicates such testing did not take place.78  
 
Before turning to these aircrew accounts in detail it is important to note that 
while an estimated 72 amphetamine million tablets were purchased for Britain’s 
armed forces, including orders for 3 million tablets by March 1942, and a further 
28 million for the Royal Navy and Merchant Fleet between August 1942 and 
June 1943, it has proved impossible to locate figures for the scale of 
amphetamine use within the RAF. Evidence indicates it was used in Fighter, 
Coastal and Bomber Commands, including by aircrew and ground staff, and it 
should be acknowledged that use in these contexts can be a sensitive subject 
given the now toxic narratives around certain psychoactive substances.79 
As Lynn Abrams observed, ‘the intersubjective dynamics within the 
interview situation should always be acknowledged honestly. We must be 
mindful that the resulting primary source, the interview, is shaped by 
perceptions on both sides’.80 If an interviewer’s pejorative feelings are not 
                                                          
78
 For example, see Author’s Archive, Bomber Command Association Questionnaire (BCAQ), H. 
Evans, September 2015; Author’s Archive, BCHQ, Anonymised response. 
79
 Betts, ‘Benzedrine Sulphate’, 215; University of Pensylvania Archives, Papers of Alfred 
Newton Richards, Box 12, Folder 6, Letter, A. N. Richards to J. Simmons, Office of Surgeon 
General, US Army, 16 March 1942; TNA, Admiralty Files (ADM) 116/5509 – Letter, Ministry of 
War Transport to Medical Director General, Royal Navy (MDG), 31 August 1942 and Note to 
MDG, 12 June 1943; Pugh, ‘“Not … like a rum ration”’; Daily Mail, 31 March 2011, 38. 
80
 L. Abrams, Oral History Theory (London 2010), 62. 
35 
acknowledged / managed then the interviewee’s response can be shaped to an 
unacceptable degree. In an interview with a Bomber Command veteran, for 
example, an IWM interviewer asked about ‘those funny tablets’, while in another 
interview, the same interviewer noted that amphetamines have got ‘a dreadful 
reputation now’. On another occasion, the interviewer made it clear to a former 
air gunner that the substance he had taken on operations was what ‘we’d call a 
drug now’.81 This is not to unduly criticise the interviewer, but it does highlight 
how contemporary attitudes to drugs can affect one’s approach to a historical 
topic. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect about the evidence from aircrew is that 
Benzedrine use in the operational context was framed almost exclusively in 
terms of wakefulness. Indeed, the aircrew nickname for Benzedrine, ‘wakey-
wakey’ pills, reflected this reality, and as several veterans recorded, the 
substance was particularly useful for sustaining wakefulness on long-duration 
nocturnal operations; especially as such operations were ‘in opposition to your 
bodies’ clock’.82 Supporting the conclusions of Winfield, a pilot with No.50 
Squadron noted that Benzedrine helped him keep awake during the vulnerable 
                                                          
81
 IWMSA, Interview 30621, B. Cecil, Reel 2. Recorded 11/2007; IWMSA, Interview 22197, F. 
Smith, Reel 6. Recorded 09/2001; IWMSA, Interview 227796, H. Irons, Reel 3. Recorded 2005. 
82
 Author’s Archive, BCAQ, C. E. Mears, 26 May 2015; Author’s Archive, BCAQ, W. H. Thomas, 
September 2015; IWMSA, Interview 30621, B. Cecil, Reel 2; IWMSA, Interview 227796, H. 
Irons, Reel 3. Recorded 2005; IWMSA, Interview 27793, J. Goodwin, Reel 4. Recorded 2005; T. 
Redding, Life and Death in Bomber Command (Revised edn Stroud 2013), 85–6; Author’s 
Archive, BCAQ, H. Rossiter, 23 September 2015. 
36 
period on the return leg as he experienced tiredness due to the post-adrenal 
crash, the general hazards of operating at night and the length to which sorties 
could run.83 Such conclusions were very often accompanied by a pragmatic or 
positive attitude toward the drug, and as a wireless operator with No.115 
Squadron recalled, there ‘wasn’t a wakey-wakey philosophy, you just took one if 
you were sleepy’. A similar sentiment was expressed by another wireless 
operator who noted that, Benzedrine tablets were ‘like Aspirin, you took them if 
you felt you needed and we treated them like that’. For another veteran, ‘[a]ny 
aid to combat fatigue, and stimulate alertness was welcome [as it] … [c]ould 
mean [the] difference between life and death’.84 
Pointing to the subjective and potentially negative effects of the drug, 
concerns that went some way to explaining the RAF’s cautious policy to 
November 1942, not all experiences with Benzedrine were positive and some 
former aircrew complained of headaches, problems with sustaining wakefulness 
and feeling overstimulated and unable to sleep on the return from operations. 
Such problems could extend into the following day and a Navigator with No.50 
Squadron noted that he experienced a ‘hangover’ from the drug.85 In turn, these 
varying effects were a factor that helped shape the frequency with which the 
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drug was utilised by aircrew, a decision also affected by personal opinion, 
medical guidance and operational conditions. For example, two veterans noted 
that they took the drug infrequently and only on operations of long duration, 
including those to Eastern Germany. This decision was shaped by the RAF’s 
policy and medical advice that cautioned aircrew against the regular use of the 
drug. However, for another veteran the drug was used on ‘every trip’ as advice 
from his MO persuaded him of the value of taking the substance.86  
Crucially, and in line with Winfield’s recommendations, the evidence 
indicates that aircrew retained the choice over utilising the substance on 
operations and several veterans recorded a similar sentiment that the use of 
Benzedrine was always down to ‘one’s own decision’.87 This provides a 
powerful corrective to the tendency to frame drug use as a top-down process, 
removing the role and agency of the individual user.88 In many respects the 
RAF created an ethical policy, supported by clear educational guidelines, which 
afforded aircrew the opportunity to make an informed choice about the use of 
Benzedrine. 
Exercising this choice, another group did not utilise Benzedrine on 
operations, reflecting feelings about their own robust constitution and deeper 
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moral concerns about the use of drugs.89 As the work of Derickson suggested, 
an ability to sustain wakefulness became a measure of manliness during the 
conflict, and when combined with popular narratives of the era that framed drug 
use as an act demonstrating moral weakness and corruptibility, it is unsurprising 
that some aircrew, operating in the hyper-masculine environment that was the 
RAF, were emphatic in their attitudes to Benzedrine tablets: ‘I’ve never taken 
one in me life. No’. Another veteran ‘refused’ to utilise Benzedrine on 
operations, noting that he ‘wasn’t interested … [and] … [n]ever thought about 
them’.90 For a pilot with No.115 Squadron, the issue of Benzedrine use was a 
‘touchy subject … for obvious reasons’ and as an RAF researcher noted in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, ‘[p]ilots as a class, naturally, did not like 
being doped’.91 Paradoxically, attitudes to consuming other drugs, either 
caffeine citrate, caffeinated drinks or alcohol, used to help regulate wakefulness 
and wellbeing, did not cause such consternation to aircrew, and caffeinated 
drinks and alcohol have a long and synergistic history with military culture.92 
Thus, while some negative attitudes found in aircrew evidence were present at 
                                                          
89
 IWMSA, Interview 28650, G. Mellor, Reel 13. Recorded February 2006; IWM Interview, 
23198. A. Watson, Reel 10 Continued. Recorded 06/2002; IWM Interview, 29529. T. Austin, 
Reel 7. Recorded January 2007. 
90
 Derickson, ‘“No Such Thing as a Night’s Sleep”’, 3; E. Newlands, ‘“They Even Gave Us 
Oranges on One Occasion”: Human Experimentation in the British Army During the Second 
World War’, War & Society, 32, 1 (March 2013), 58; IWMSA, Interview 27798, J. McGillivray, 
Reel 5. Recorded 2005; Author’s Archive, BCAQ, J. Flowers, June 2015. 
91
 R. C. Browne, ‘Amphetamine in the Air Force’, British Journal of Addiction, 44, 2 (July 1947), 
70. 
92
 Francis, The Flyer, 35–6; Derickson, ‘“No Such Thing as a Night’s Sleep”’, 7–9. 
39 
the time, others have been retrospectively influenced by the toxic narratives 
around drugs, including those shaped by oral history interviewers.  
Yet, irrespective of the attitudes displayed in the aircrew evidence, the 
one common thread to almost all accounts is the framing of Benzedrine use in 
terms of wakefulness and no mention of the drug’s wellbeing related effects – 
euphoria, confidence, determination and aggression. From a theoretical 
perspective, evidence indicates that oral history participants tend to struggle to 
remember emotions and Benzedrine’s effects on wellbeing may well fall into this 
category.93 It could also be that the sensitive nature of the subject compelled 
individuals to unconsciously medicalise aspects of recollections so as to 
downplay reference to confidence or euphoria. The need to take a tablet to 
provide a boost to stamina or endurance may have been a difficult issue to 
confront for some veterans. For others, it may be that descriptors such as 
‘euphoric’ were not used as they were too closely bound with the narrative of 
recreational drug use. More simply, such language may not have been part of 
the lexicon of some aircrews, and cultural factors shaped the manner in which 
individuals understood their experience of Benzedrine.94 
                                                          
93
 Abrams, Oral History, 87–8, 94–5. The author is grateful to Thomas Cheetham of the 
University of Wolverhampton for this reference.  
94
 Rasmussen, On Speed, 88; DeGrandpre, Cult of Pharmacology, 174. 
40 
Importantly, the focus on wakefulness also reflected the influence of the 
RAF’s own policy and the advice and guidance issued to crews. As Bartlett 
observed, the ‘maximal suggestion effect’ can be obtained by ‘linking its 
[Benzedrine] use with the efficient performance of the job at hand’; a factor 
demonstrated in operational testing.95 Acknowledged by German researchers of 
the era as the Toxische Gleichung, the ‘toxic equation’ of individual biology, 
psychology and the circumstances in which the drug was utilised, Bartlett was 
illustrating a sophisticated point relating to what would become known as the 
‘set’ and ‘setting’ of drug use; what Ido Hartogsohn has called ‘extra-
pharmacological factors’.96 As Norman Zinberg observed, ‘set’ is ‘the attitude of 
the person at the time of use, including … personality’ and ‘setting’ is ‘the 
influence of the physical and social setting within which the use occurs’. These 
factors, combined with the pharmacological action of the drug, have a profound 
effect on the experience of those using the substance. Taking the time to 
provide guidance and education on the use of drugs, including issues relating to 
the effects and effectiveness of a substance, can affect both personal mind-set 
and operational setting or context, helping to manage expectation while 
promoting safe and efficient use. By creating a functional ‘script’ around the 
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drug, which emphasised the wakefulness related effects of the substance while 
actively cautioning against its use in terms of wellbeing, RAF policy and 
subsequent guidance from MOs helped set the personal and operational tone 
for the experience of utilising Benzedrine for aircrews.97  
Understanding these extra pharmacological factors helps explain why 
Benzedrine use appeared to be calculated and functional for most aircrew. Of 
course, the diary of Joan Wyndham, an officer with the Women’s Auxiliary Air 
Force, and the memoir of Miles Tripp, provides details of the recreational use of 
Benzedrine within the RAF. These recollections are supported by Mears, who 
noted that, ‘chatter among crews suggested they [Benzedrine tablets] were 
useful for short leave passes’.98 However, to say that Benzedrine was ‘virtually 
addictive’ and used by ‘many flyers’, either as a form of quasi-psychiatric 
medicine or as a recreational drug, stretches the available evidence beyond the 
point of breaking. In turn, it is unwise to be too critical of RAF policy and 
practice in this regard, as in spite of the regulatory steps, the drug was 
prominent in a social and cultural sense and remained widely available. As 
such, efforts to restrict use of the substance could have had only a limited effect 
in practice, and a decision to focus on educating aircrews was sensible. This is 
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not to deny or downplay the recreational or possibly dysfunctional use of 
Benzedrine, but it highlights the complex range of logistical, moral and 
pragmatic forces that helped shape Air Ministry policy. 
 
After several years of investigations, the RAF ended 1942 with a policy that 
approved the use of Benzedrine on operations; the result of a lengthy and 
complex process shaped by the media profile of the drug, concerns about the 
effects and effectiveness of the substance and wider moral considerations. 
While acknowledging the ambiguous and overlapping meanings of fatigue, 
Benzedrine was introduced to assist aircrew with the wakefulness related 
aspects of this phenomenon. This conclusion, supported by the operational 
evidence, points to individuals utilising the drug based on a desire to prevent 
sleep and maintain alertness during the part of a sortie where aircrew were at 
greatest risk. This process was overtly shaped by the RAF’s own policy, which 
stressed the value of the wakefulness related effects of Benzedrine while 
cautioning against those relating to wellbeing. Nuancing existing perspectives, 
at no point did the RAF see Benzedrine as a miracle solution to the challenge of 
aircrew fatigue, a point emphasised in educational material for aircrew. 
Throughout the process of testing, the organisation had a clear understanding 
that, at most, Benzedrine would be an imperfect weapon in the fatigue 
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countermeasure armoury. The drug was neither an ‘angel’ nor a ‘demon’ for the 
RAF. 
